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CONSTITUTIONAL FORBEARANCE 
 





 Five district judges have ruled on the constitutionality of 
the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA),1 also sometimes referred to as “Obamacare.”2  
The two appointed by Republican Presidents held that the mandate 
violated the Constitution, while the three appointed by Democratic 
Presidents upheld the law.  In the wake of these rulings, countless 
commentators quickly inferred that the judges’ political 
preferences and affiliations were deciding factors and forecast that 
the seemingly inevitable Supreme Court decision of the matter 
would split the High Court 5-4, with Justice Kennedy casting the 
deciding vote.  The four other Justices appointed by Republicans 
are expected to vote to invalidate the law, and the four Justices 
appointed by Democrats are expected to vote to sustain it.3 
 How we came to this juncture, why, and who bears the 
blame are difficult and divisive questions.  But for reasons 
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1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(2010). 
2 See, e.g., Milton R. Wolf, Buck Up and Stop Obamacare; GOP Should Seek 
Approval from Tea Party, Not Democratic Party, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, 
at B3. 
3 See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
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explored below all concerned ought to able to agree that the 
current state of affairs is regrettable, if not intolerable.  In short, as 
the Obamacare cases starkly illustrate, our constitutional law too 
often both looks and is too much like ordinary, partisan politics by 
another means.  Putting aside questions about the provenance of 
the present dilemma, this essay ventures a claim about the way out 
of it.  Ironically the same cases that so plainly exhibit the problem 
also provide a means to begin solving it. 
 At the most basic level the solution requires the recovery of 
a creditable distinction between constitutional law and partisan 
politics.  This distinction depends upon, among other things, 
regular public displays that such a distinction can and does exist.  
The single, most effective way to exhibit the difference between 
law and politics is for judges to refrain from advancing politically 
desirable (to them) ends out of a respect for contrary constitutional 
law.  A judge who exercises this sort of self-restraint engages in 
constitutional forbearance.  And the Obamacare cases present the 
Roberts Court with a singular opportunity for its conservative 
members to exercise noble, notable, and healing constitutional 
forbearance. 
 This essay begins by developing the concept of 
constitutional forbearance and exploring the role it properly plays 
in the craft of good judging.  This first Part also illustrates what is 
meant by constitutional forbearance by recovering a forgotten but 
illustrative example from a century ago.  Part II then argues that 
the need for forbearance has at present become unusually acute.  
Finally, in Part III this essay identifies some of the qualities of the 
Obamacare cases that make them such excellent opportunities for 
the exercise of this much needed judicial virtue and answers some 
anticipated objections to thinking about the cases in this way. 
 
I.  Forbearance As A Constitutional Virtue 
  
 In general, forbearance is an undervalued virtue.  To some 
extent, this is inevitable, as forbearance tends by its very nature to 
be invisible.  Conspicuous forbearance may be an oxymoron.  Yet 
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it is hard to resist the conclusion that prior ages valued forbearance 
more than our own.  Ancient historians celebrated Cincinnatus as 
singularly noble because of his surrender of dictatorial authority 
and return to a pacific and pastoral lifestyle when the military 
threat to Rome had been neutralized.4  This myth in turn echoed in 
founding era paeans to George Washington, who on multiple 
occasions declined opportunities to assert or seize power in 
deference to an emerging culture of constitutional, civilian 
republican government.5  Well into the nineteenth century, the 
equation of nobility with forbearance in the exercise of power 
exerted  discernable influence on public discourse.  But by the end 
of the twentieth century, forbearance was markedly less likely to 
figure prominently in narratives of noble public service.  When 
historians were asked to rank the U.S. Presidents, the results 
reflected a distinct preference for men of bold, even legally 
dubious action, over their more restrained colleagues.6 
 
 A.  The Value of Judicial Forbearance 
 
 One social sphere where a culture of forbearance arguably 
lingered well into twentieth century was the realm of jurists.  
Indeed, forbearance might be the virtue most indispensable to 
                                                 
4 See Jim Chen, The American Ideology,  VAND. L. REV. 809, 816 n.33 (1995). 
5 See generally GARY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON & THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (1984) (describing Washington as “a virtuoso of 
resignations”); see also Gordon Wood, The Greatness of George Washington, 
68 VA.Q.REV. 189 (1992) (asserting that the “greatest act of his life, the one that 
made him famous, was his resignation as commander-in-chief” of the 
Continental Army after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War). 
6 See, e.g., William Douglas, Presidential Legacy; Is Truman Bounce in the 
Future for Bush?; Scholars Debate Whether His Status Will Increase After He 
Leaves Office, THE HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2007, at 15 ; but see Ivan Eland, 
Op-Ed., From Van Buren to Bush, a Better Way to Rank US Presidents, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1999, at 9. (arguing that it is “time to rethink 
the way we rate presidents” and that “Presidential rankings should be based on 
different standards: Did the president uphold the Constitution, and have an 
agenda that contributed to peace, prosperity, and liberty, and was he reasonably 
adept at getting that agenda implemented?”). 
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virtuous judging.  In our constitutional order, the judiciary is 
uniquely tasked to enforce fundamental policy determinations not 
of its own making.7  After all, the whole theory of judicial review 
is not that the courts may correct legislative missteps but rather 
that the judicial duty to the law includes the obligation to enforce 
higher law at the expense of a statute when the two are found to be 
in irreconcilable conflict.8  That this classical explanation of 
judicial review is viewed with skepticism in many quarters 
provides all the more reason for judges to act so as to shore up the 
distinction between constitutional law and politics. 
 And constitutional forbearance is the most effective way to 
accomplish this goal.  As a general matter, legal forbearance 
occurs whenever any public official exercises authority to produce 
a result that is, in her eyes, suboptimal but nonetheless required by 
law.  The concept of the rule of law envisions and requires nothing 
less if law is to be anything more than a loose set of discretionary 
guidelines to persons in power.  A Judge or Justice engages in 
constitutional forbearance whenever she concludes that her policy 
preferences conflict with what the Constitution requires, and she 
then rules in conformity with the latter and in disregard of the 
former.   In so doing, she offers herself as living proof that 
constitutional law is not just politics by other means.  It is worth 
noting that forbearance, so understood, does not necessarily equate 
to deference to the political branches of government.  To the 
contrary, forbearance would include invalidation of a wise or even 
a crucially important statute (in the judge’s estimation), if the 
Constitution (in the judge’s estimation) prohibits such a law.  Of 
course, forbearance would also include acquiescence in a 
constitutional statute that the judge believed to be an invitation to 
disaster or even a mandate of manifest injustice. 
                                                 
7 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at xii (1992) (“[W]hen a judge swears to uphold 
the Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone 
else.”). 
8 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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 We might hope that our constitutional law would be 
sufficiently enlightened that it would only rarely permit (or 
proscribe) that which thoughtful people oppose (or support).  But 
to the extent that any separation exists between constitutional law 
and judicial policy preferences (often about enormously important 
and complex matters over which reasonable people profoundly 
disagree), such cases are not only inevitable but should be 
common.  In this sense, the measure of a good or virtuous judge 
would not be the frequency with which she does “the right thing” 
as she perceives it, but rather the frequency with which she 
abstains from doing so in the name of a contrary legal rule.  To the 
extent that the Constitution is to be distinct from politics, this 
measure should be no less applicable to constitutional than to 
contract law.  If anything, given the inherent ambiguity of a 
constitution with such capacious clauses as ours has, and intended 
to endure as long as it has and (we hope) will, forbearance in the 
use of the power of judicial review to accomplish what are, in a 
judge’s eyes, desirable ends may be even more essential to 
constitutional legal faith than any other subject addressed by law.9 
 As noted above, the traditional justification for judicial 
review depends upon the assumption that the Constitution supplies 
a rule that trumps any contrary rule supplied by a mere statute.10  
One need not believe the judicial process a mechanistic one to 
conclude that the judge should be significantly constrained in 
discovering the rule the Constitution provides.  This understanding 
of judicial review in effect assigns to the judge a crucially 
important but sharply limited role.  The judge is but one actor in a 
larger drama designed to achieve the public good to the extent that 
is humanly possible.  But the authors of the play did not limit 
themselves to an extended judicial soliloquy.  Rather, the judge is 
merely one agent in what is meant to be, collectively, a moral 
                                                 
9 Cf. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of 
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 587-88 (2008) 
(identifying and discussing some of the negative effects of the politicization of 
constitutional law). 
10 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
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system.  Of course the concept of such a limited role should be 
familiar to any lawyer in an adversarial system such as our own.11  
The notion provides the logically sufficient answer to that 
notorious question used to bedevil lawyers: how can you represent 
people like that (i.e., people guilty of crimes, or harms to the 
environment, or outrageous avarice, etc.)?12  The lawyer has 
accepted a limited and, in isolation, amoral role in service of a 
larger scheme designed to serve moral ends.13  One need only 
consider that the alternative system is deemed “inquisitorial” to get 
a fairly good sense of why the adversarial system might be thought 
a morally compelling one.  A judge similarly accepts an 
indispensable, but circumscribed role in a larger system of 
government carefully wrought, on balance, best to advance the 
public good over the long term. 
 The logic of the matter, in the case of both the advocate and 
the judge, is fairly straightforward.  But obedience to the limits on 
one’s role can be psychologically trying in the extreme.14  This 
duty requires a judge to subordinate her own view of the public 
good to the assessment of others and then to carry that assessment 
into effect in concrete circumstances, which may not have been 
fully envisioned when the general policy was formulated and, in 
any event, which the judge has come to know far more intimately 
than would ever be possible for a legislator acting ex ante.  In other 
words, the judge confronts the particular persons to whom abstract 
decisions, with which the judge may or may not agree, are to be 
applied.  When a judge is called to serve as an agent in effecting 
(what the judge believes to be) a misguided or even immoral result, 
                                                 
11 See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER’S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM (1975). 
12 See, e.g., JAMES S. KUNEN, “HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?”: THE 
MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983). 
13 Id. 
14 Cf. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785616 (stressing that “judges are engaged in an 
occupation that involves ‘emotional regulation’”). 
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the judge suffers a profound cognitive dissonance,15 in much the 
same way would an attorney charged with representing a client the 
attorney believed to be in the wrong.16  In both cases the human 
mind recoils from this uncomfortable tension and seeks to avoid 
it.17  Thus, a danger arises that the judge will, consciously or 
unconsciously, distort her perception of the facts or understanding 
of the law in an effort to escape this dilemma.18   The inevitable 
propensity to psychological self-defense creates a corresponding 
risk of cognitive biases,19 even (perhaps especially) among those 
judges most committed to an honorable satisfaction of their official 
responsibilities. 
 This natural drift in the direction of a judge’s own 
preferences must be countered with an equal and opposite force 
                                                 
15 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
(1957).  Festinger described cognitive dissonance as the result of discord among 
an individual’s knowledge, opinions, and beliefs. See id. at 1-3, 9-15. He argued 
that the presence of dissonance motivates its subject to engage in dissonance 
reduction or dissonance avoidance. See id. at 29-31, 263-66.  Numerous legal 
scholars have recognized the relevance of these insights for understanding and 
evaluating judicial behavior.  See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological 
Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1267, 1297 (2009); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision-
making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 
1624-25 (2006). 
16 See, e.g., Gabriel Lerner, How Teaching Political and Ethical Theory Could 
Help Solve Two of the Legal Profession’s Biggest Problems, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 781, 783 (2006) (noting that “there is often a dissonance (or at least a 
perceived dissonance) between how a human being should ethically behave and 
how a lawyer should ethically behave” and that “[m]ost people want to be 
decent human beings, yet lawyers, if they make their clients’ interests the 
highest priority, must frequently do things, such as impugn the character of a 
truthful witness, that would be reprehensible if done by a non-lawyer”). 
17 See supra note 15. 
18 See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What 
Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 417 (2009) (noting that 
judges might “sincerely bas[e] their decisions on their views of the law” but that 
what they understand the law to require might be “shaped by their values -- 
operating not as resources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal 
influences on their perception of legally consequential facts”). 
19 See id. 
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lest the distinction between law and politics vanish.  The source of 
this counterbalance can either be internal or external to the 
judiciary.20  The few external constraints on a sitting federal 
judge’s discretion are, by design, notoriously weak21 and are in any 
event better adapted to remedy outrageous, self-conscious abuses 
of the judicial role and provide little incentive for a judge to be 
rigorously self-critical about her own motives and assessments.22  
The principle internal constraint grows out the judge’s desire to be 
perceived by her judicial colleagues, the practicing bar, and, 
perhaps to a lesser extent, the general public as consummate in the 
judicial role.23  This desire in turn pushes a judge to strive to root 
out and resist unconscious biases and assumptions in constitutional 
cases only to the extent these three communities, and especially the 
first, believe in and prize preservation of a distinction between 
constitutional law and politics. 
 Judges no less than anyone else exhibit their commitments 
through their actions.  A judge’s exercise of constitutional 
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the distinction between internal and external constraints on 
judges, see Michael J. Gerhardt, How a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185, 
2196-97 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)). 
21 See Richard A. Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10 
(2007) (noting that federal judges are “sheltered from removal (except through 
the extraordinary act of impeachment) by the gift of life tenure, buoyed in their 
words and actions by an indulgent theory of judicial independence, and freed 
from the solemn commitment to popular accountability” and that “[w]hen 
coupled with these emoluments, the mighty pen that judges wield without 
popular review becomes perhaps the most powerful instrument controlled by 
any public body in civil society”). 
22 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32,  
42 (2005) (discussing external constraints on the Court and concluding that 
“[t]here are political limits on what the Court can do, but they are capacious”). 
23 See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance 
Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753, 
1796 (2004) (observing that “[t]o the extent that judges care about their prestige 
and power--and truly want to earn the respect of their colleagues and the legal 
community generally--it is crucial that they be perceived to base their decisions 
on the law” and that the “prospect of public exposure, criticism, and reputational 
harm are among the most powerful forces that lead judges to ground their 
decisions in existing legal materials”). 
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forbearance exhibits her belief in and dedication to a separation of 
constitutional law and her personal political predilections.  As 
such, instances of judicial forbearance can over time reinforce 
forbearance as a norm governing judicial behavior.24  Moreover, a 
commitment to forbearance depends on a faith that one’s judicial 
colleagues both share and rigorously pursue this same virtue.25  
Each judicial act of forbearance is in this sense a unilateral step in 
a longer sequence aimed at achieving multi-lateral judicial 
disarmament.26  Of course, in a similar fashion departures from the 
norm weaken it.27  Law is a socially constructed reality, the 
meaning and significance of which is forever in the process of 
regeneration.28  In order for there to be any law in constitutional 
law there must be, among other things, patterns of mutually 
reinforcing judicial behavior that at once make judges be and look 
like something other than politicians in robes. 
 It bears emphasis that the value of constitutional 
forbearance is not merely a matter of perception.  As Brian 
Tamanaha has observed: 
  
[I]deals have the potential to create a reality in their 
image only so long as they are believed in and acted 
pursuant to.  This might sound fanciful, like 
suggesting that something can be conjured up by 
                                                 
24 Cf. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE 
LAW 236 (2006) (noting that the “threat to the rule of law is not that judges are 
incapable of rendering decisions in an objective fashion” but rather that they 
“come to believe that it cannot be done, or that most fellow judges are not doing 
it”) (emphasis in original). 
25 See id. (identifying as a serious threat to the rule of law a judicial skepticism 
about the dedication of one’s colleagues to following the law). 
26 Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency 
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 
431, 474-475 (1996) (illustrating through game theory and through other 
empirical evidence that courts, and especially the Supreme Court, employ 
forbearance in situations where it assists their political or ideological goals). 
27 See TAMANAHA, supra note 24, at 236. 
28 See id. at 5-6. 
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wishful thinking; or it might sound elitist, like the 
“noble lie,” the idea that it is sometimes better for 
the masses to believe in myths because the truth is 
too much to handle.  But it is neither.  It is a routine 
application of the proposition widely accepted 
among social theorists and social scientists that 
much of social reality is the construction of our 
ideas and beliefs.29 
 
So constitutional forbearance not only leads to a firmer faith in a 
distinction between constitutional law and politics but also both 
reflects and reinforces the truth of that faith. 
 
 B.  The Analytical Contribution of Forbearance 
 
 What difference ought these considerations make in the 
actual practice of the judicial craft? 
 None in most cases; a lot in a few.  Since the ultimate 
objective is to cabin the influence a judge’s personal policy 
preferences have on the outcome of the cases she decides, most 
often the wisest course is for the judge to pretend like those 
preferences do not exist.30  Of course, this is precisely what, at 
least superficially, judges do all the time.31  But judges no less than 
the rest of us are irreducibly political creatures, and their politics 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 Justice Frankfurter spoke of himself, albeit some have charged hypocrtically, 
as a “politcal eunuch,” an arresting metaphor.  See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE 
TWICE-TOLD TALE OF MR. FIX-IT:REFLECTIONS ON THE BRANDEIS 
FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 9 (1982).  
31  For example Judge Vinson began his opinion striking down the ACA by 
stating “this case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or 
whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care 
system.”  Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., No. 
3:10-cv-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); see also Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2010) (calling 
the government’s goal of expanding health care “laudable” but ultimately 
concluding that the scheme is unconstitutional). 
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necessarily manifest themselves as subtle biases in their perception 
of both law and fact.32  Ignoring these influences will not make 
them go away.33  What we can expect judges to do, however, is be 
aware of their preferences and resist their gravitational pull.34 
 It would be as inappropriate as it is unlikely were this 
resistance to manifest itself as hostility to one’s preferred 
outcomes.  Applied rigorously, such an approach would produce a 
perverse anti-bias-bias that would work a distortion in legal 
process that amounts to a mirror-image of the slant it was adopted 
to cure.  And this corruption would not even provide the benefit of 
desirable (in the judge’s eyes) outcomes in individual cases.  In the 
vast majority of cases, a good judge, like a good umpire,35 has to 
“call them as she sees them,” without any weight accorded either 
the home team or the visitors.36 
 But awareness of the value of constitutional forbearance 
should pull a judge ever so slightly towards an occasion of its 
exercise.  The force of this attraction would have to be minimal in 
magnitude to avoid the absurd perversity outlined above.  
Therefore in the vast run of cases this attraction would have no 
                                                 
32 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
33 Cf. Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to 
Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 837, 895-98 (2009) (urging judges to identify culturally determined 
heuristic biases and take steps to minimize their impact). 
34 Id.de 
35 For likely the most notorious recent use of this analogy, see the statement of 
Chief Justice Roberts at his Senate confirmation hearing.  See Confirmation 
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.). 
36 See id. at 448 (answer of John G. Roberts, Jr. to question posed by Sen. 
Richard Durbin) (“I had someone ask me in this process . . . ‘Are you going to 
be on the side of the little guy?’ And you obviously want to give an immediate 
answer, but as you reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the little guy should 
win, the little guy is going to win in court before me.  But if the Constitution 
says that the big guy should win, well, then, the big guy is going to win, because 
my obligation is to the Constitution.”). 
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effect.  In a narrow set of highly politicized and deeply 
indeterminate cases, however, it should be decisive. 
 The strength of the typically minimal attraction towards 
forbearance should grow as a particular case becomes more 
politicized.37  This correlation makes sense for two reasons.  First, 
as the politicization of a case increases, so does the temptation a 
judge might feel to give reign to his personal political 
predilections.  After all, the politicization of the case reflects 
among other things the extent to which persons not party to the suit 
will be affected by and care about its resolution.38  The more 
widespread the interest in the ruling, the more likely is the judge to 
be distracted by that interest.39  As the risk of cognitive bias 
increases, so must the force set in opposition to it, at least it if it is 
expected to have the desired effect.  Second, as a case becomes 
increasingly politicized, the risk that others will perceive, correctly 
or not, a ruling to be politically motivated likewise increases.40  
Though the point of forbearance is not solely or even primarily 
about professional and public perceptions, they do matter. 41 
 Also important is the degree to which the relevant 
constitutional law is settled and relatively clearly dictates a result 
in the case.  Even when at its zenith, the draw of forbearance 
should not be strong enough to displace a settled legal rule.  The 
                                                 
37 There is, of course, no scientific metric by which one can measure the extent 
to which a case has been excessively politicized.  One can, however, point to 
indicia that a particular suit or issue has been politicized.  Those indicia and 
their relevance to the ACA cases is discussed at infra notes 171-219 and 
accompanying text.  
38 Cf. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 974-84 (2009) (discussing the 
enormous significance of some judicial opinions for persons not party to the 
suit). 
39 See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial 
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1605-06 (2004) (“In cases of high political 
salience [] judges are most in need of guidance from the Constitution because 
these are the cases where their raw personal preferences are most likely to 
distort the judicial norm of dispassionate analysis.”).  
40 See id. 
41 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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whole point of forbearance is to strengthen rule of law values, so it 
would make no sense to compromise them in its service.  But as is 
developed below,42 modern constitutional law is hardly 
mathematical in its precision.  Moreover, even within the realm of 
constitutional law, there are areas that are more or less rule-bound 
than others.  And in those cases where the traditional tools of 
constitutional analysis -- constitutional text, history, precedent -- 
leave the judge with little direction and much discretion, even the 
ordinarily negligible pull towards forbearance should be enough to 
move the needle and resolve the controversy.  
 At least that is the theory of judicial virtue underlying this 
essay.  But how has this theory been reflected in actual practice?  
A historical example supplies concrete detail to an otherwise 
hopelessly abstract discussion at the same time it might provide 
some defense to the charge naïveté.                           
 
 C.  The Ghost of Forbearance Past 
 
 History has not been kind to Justice James Clark 
McReynolds, and for good reason.43  But his unfortunate, even 
unforgivable, bigotry and boorish behavior ought not obscure his 
virtues as a judge, the chief of which was an unwavering 
dedication to constitutional duty as he perceived it.  On at least two 
historic occasions, this dedication trumped his strong personal 
predilections to his enduring credit. 
 The first was the product of his belief that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected a core sphere of individual autonomy from 
regulatory infringement.  This belief was notoriously manifest in 
his much-maligned adherence to economic substantive due process 
well past what in retrospect can clearly be seen as the doctrine’s 
                                                 
42 See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
43 See generally JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE 
JAMES CLARK MCREYNOLDS (1992). 
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expiration date.44  He is less well remembered for his faithful 
adherence to these principles in non-economic contexts on behalf 
of a then-widely vilified ethnic minority.  While the following 
passage from the Court’s opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska is oft-
quoted, it is rarely noted that McReynolds was its author:  
 
While this court has not attempted to define with 
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has 
received much consideration and some of the 
included things have been definitely stated. Without 
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to 
contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to 
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own 
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the 
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.45 
 
Still, the context of the ruling is even less often recalled.  At the 
height of the anti-German hysteria following U.S. entry into the 
First World War, Nebraska, likely many states enacted laws that 
prohibited the teaching of any modern language other than 
English.46  McReynolds was far from immune from the kind of 
vehement passions that led to these enactments.  Indeed, two years 
earlier, in a notorious dissent from the Court’s reversal of two 
German-Americans espionage convictions, McReynolds defended 
the trial courts apparent anti-German prejudice as reasonable and 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (McReynolds, J., 
dissenting); Gold Cases, 294 U.S. 240, 317 (1935) ((McReynolds, J., 
dissenting). 
45 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
46 William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical 
Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1988). 
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justified in the light of recent, common experience.47  But he was 
able to bridle these passions in Meyer and vindicate a broad 
conception of individual liberty, over a dissent by Justice Holmes.  
In doing so, McReynolds led the Court to an exemplary, and 
praiseworthy, act of constitutional forbearance. 
 Nor was this a singular episode in McReynolds’s long 
judicial career.  He alone exhibited impressive forbearance in 
service of constitutional principle when confronted with the federal 
government’s first volley in the now century-old “war on drugs.”  
Within ten years of the New York legislature’s enactment of one of 
the nation’s first major narcotics laws, Congress passed the 
revealingly labeled Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914.  The 
Court construed the Act broadly to supplant any contrary state law 
and impose a nationwide blanket prohibition on the sale of 
narcotics, to be enforced with severe criminal penalties, excepting 
only that distribution the Treasury Department (and the Court) 
deemed to be “in the regular course of the professional practice of 
medicine.”48   Then in United States v. Doremus the Court rebuffed 
the claim that the Act, so construed, exceeded Congress’s power to 
tax.  Justice Day’s opinion reasoned that the Act was within the 
ambit of congressional authority so long as it had “some 
reasonable relation” to the raising of revenue, even if the law’s 
“effect [was] to accomplish another purpose as well.”49  Courts 
were not to inquire into congressional motives.50  Applying these 
precepts, Justice Day eagerly endorsed the fiction that the 
regulatory character of the Harrison Act was merely incidental to 
its revenue raising function manifested solely in the statute’s 
                                                 
47 See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 42-43 (1921) (McReynolds, J., 
dissenting).  See generally PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE 
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 87-90 (1997) (discussing McReynolds’s 
hostility to Germans). 
48 United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 959 (W.D. Tex. 1918) (quoting 
indictment), rev’d, 249 U.S. 86 (1919). 
49 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919). 
50 Id. at 93 (“[F]rom an early day the Court has held that the fact that other 
motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the 
courts to inquire into that subject.”). 
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imposition of a nominal $1 per annum tax.  Four Justices, 
including McReynolds, dissented. 
 Judicial deference to claimed congressional purposes may 
be defensible, indeed even laudable, in light of the relative 
institutional competence and legitimacy of these two branches of 
the national government.  But selective deference is, of course, not 
deference at all but rather merely a disguise for inchoate judicial 
policy judgments avowedly the province of the legislature.  And in 
The Child Labor Tax Case,51 the Court selectively abandoned the 
posture of deference it had assumed in Doremus in favor of its 
perceived obligation to assess independently whether the 
challenged law “impose[d] a tax with only that incidental restraint 
and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve” or whether the 
statute “regulate[d] by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty.” 52 
 Justice McReynolds was, appropriately, troubled by the 
Court’s inconsistency on federalism.  In his opinion for a 
unanimous Court in United States v. Daugherty,53 he welcomed, 
indeed outlined, an argument that Doremus be overruled: 
 
The constitutionality of the [Harrison] Anti Narcotic 
Act, touching which this court so sharply divided in 
United States v. Doremus, was not raised below, and 
has not been again considered.  The doctrine approved 
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,  The Child Labor Tax Case, 
                                                 
51 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 
(1922). 
52 Id. at 36.  Taft’s opinion for the Court identified only one difference between 
the two statutes.  Whereas the Child Labor Tax Law was “on the face of the act 
[a] penalty,” any ulterior motive that may have contributed to the passage of the 
narcotics law was “not shown on [its] face.”  Id. at 39, 43.  But even that alleged 
difference ignored the unanswered conclusion of the Doremus trial court and 
four Supreme Court dissenters that the terms of the Harrison Act standing alone 
revealed that the law’s actual purpose was narcotics regulation, not revenue 
collection.  See generally A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of 
Federalism, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 109-10 (2007) (discussing the 
Harrison Act cases). 
53 269 U.S. 360 (1926). 
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[] and Linder v. United States, may necessitate a 
review of that question, if hereafter properly 
presented.54 
 
But a majority of the Justices were content to allow Congress to 
exercise what in effect amounted to a general police power so long 
as the power was discharged against conduct the Justices 
themselves found abhorrent.  When the issue finally returned in 
Nigro v. United States,55 the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality 
of the Harrison Act. 
 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft first adopted 
the government’s broad interpretation of the Act, which in effect 
criminalized receipt of the covered narcotics by anyone absent a 
physician’s lawful prescription for an approved medicinal use.56  
So interpreted, the Act fairly obviously constituted a spurious use 
of the taxing power to prohibit private conduct deemed dangerous 
and immoral, a responsibility not entrusted by the Constitution’s 
enumerated powers to the federal government but rather one 
reserved to the states.  In form, at least, Chief Justice Taft agreed 
that the federal government lacked any such power.57  Taft 
nevertheless upheld the Act on the transparent fiction that its strict 
constraints on both those who might sell and those who might buy 
narcotics were merely incidental to tax collection.58  It was as if 
Congress prohibited the sale of all alcoholic beverages in order to 
ensure that distributors paid the excise tax on alcohol sales.  Taft 
                                                 
54 Id. at 362-63. (citations omitted). 
55 276 U.S. 332 (1928).  That decision addressed and resolved a series of 
questions that the Eighth Circuit had, in a now-extinct procedure, certified for 
Supreme Court consideration. 
56 Id. at 344. 
57 Early in his analysis, he avowed that “[i]n interpreting the act, we must 
assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all.  If it is 
a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the purchase of the 
opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress, and must be 
regarded as invalid, just as the Child Labor Act of Congress was held to be.”  Id. 
at 341 (citing Bailey, Collector, v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922)). 
58 Nigro, 276 U.S. at 353-54. 
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justified congressional elimination of the non-medicinal narcotics 
market as a means of ensuring that the distributors in that market 
paid their registration fees.  The surgery was a success, but the 
patient died. 
 McReynolds must have been sympathetic with the policy of 
narcotics prohibition, likely for reasons both righteous and 
ignoble.59  But he declined to join in the Court’s willful blindness.  
In his dissent, he acknowledged what must have been obvious to 
everyone, namely that Congress’s “plain intent [was] to control the 
traffic within the States by preventing sales except to registered 
persons and holders of prescriptions,” a bald usurpation of the 
police power reserved to the States.60  Thus, unlike most of his 
colleagues,61 McReynolds resisted the temptation to honor 
federalism in the breach in service of the apparently worthy causes 
of preventing addition and preserving traditional mores, causes in 
which he must have wholeheartedly believed.  In so doing, he 
again demonstrated admirable fortitude, exemplified judicial 
forbearance, and exhibited a distinction between constitutional law 
and politics.  As explained below, the challenge to the individual 
health-insurance mandate provides sitting judges with an 
unparalleled opportunity to follow his example. 
 
II.  A Time Ripe for Forbearance 
 
 Rarely has the need for constitutional forbearance been 
more acute than it is today.  The very possibility of a meaningful 
distinction between law and politics is dismissed as naive by 
                                                 
59 McReynolds expressly acknowledged the “evils incident to the use of opium.”  
Nigro, 276 U.S. at 357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).  For a discussion of 
McReynolds’s antipathy for unorthodox persons and conduct, see generally 
BOND, supra note 43, at 124-26 & 136. 
60 Nigro, 276 U.S. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
61 Justice Sutherland joined Justice McReynolds’s dissent.  Id. at 356.  Justice 
Butler dissented on the ground that he would have rejected the government’s 
broad construction of the Act and, thereby, avoided the constitutional question.  
Id.  at 357-58 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
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some.62  To those truly hardened into this skepticism, this essay 
has little to say.  Many others, however, hold out hope in the 
possibility of this demarcation, while at the same time their doubts 
grow about current federal judges’ and justices’ commitment to 
achieving it.63 
 To be sure, this problem has been long in the making.  One 
of the central, recurring questions of twentieth-century American 
history was what role judicial review ought to play in the nation’s 
political and social life.  A mere five years into the century, a 
divided Supreme Court asserted the power and duty to scrutinize 
regulations of the terms of labor contracts, then an emerging trend 
in the wake of industrialization, in the name of common law rights 
to which the Court had accorded constitutional status.64  Of course 
the resulting economic substantive due process jurisprudence, 
when joined with inconstant efforts to limit Congress to a strict 
reading of its enumerated powers,65 ultimately provoked a singular 
constitutional crisis in which the Court first resisted and then 
succumbed to concentrated pressure from Congress and the 
President.66  During this same period legal theory underwent 
momentous change, as a nineteenth-century faith in natural law 
and legal science was replaced with legal realism’s emphasis on 
the inevitable choices judges make in deciding cases, even when 
purporting to do so according to an apparently mechanistic 
application of legal rules.  Some realists went so far as to contest 
the power of law to provide any constraint on raw judicial will.67  
Other, however, more moderate critics sustained a faith in law’s 
capacity to constrain at the same time they stressed that some 
                                                 
62 See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 235-44 (discussing and critiquing this 
view).  
63 See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 9, at 587. 
64 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
65 See generally Bryant, supra note 52.  
66 See generally THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE 
STATES AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS 
143-61 (2006) 
67 See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 235. 
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judgments about matters of public policy were an unavoidable 
aspect of judging.68 
 The Court’s ill-fated New Deal Era confrontation with the 
political branches was soon explained as the wages of the judicial 
sin of hubris.  The Court had conflated its legitimate role in 
enforcing fundamental law with an illegitimate resistance to the 
politically unfamiliar.69  The lesson widely drawn from the clash 
and the Court’s ensuing retreat was that the Court was poorly 
situated and ill-equipped to second guess the inevitable 
compromises embodied in social and economic legislation.70  At 
the same time, the Court asserted the possibility of a more active 
role in the protection of “discrete and insular minorities,” who 
might be unable to protect themselves in the legislative arena.71 
Thus at the heart of American jurisprudence in the first decades of 
the last century was a hard-earned skepticism about a distinction 
between law, especially constitutional law, and politics. 
 The Court’s reservation of a theoretical right to intervene 
on behalf of minorities became a reality with the Court’s 1954 
invalidation of public-school segregation in Brown v. Board of 
Education,72 the pre-eminent legal event of the century.  A former 
governor of California, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a 
unanimous Court, which dismissed the historical record of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as “at best, . . . inconclusive,”73 and 
proceeded with a highly contextualized and pragmatic discussion 
of the contemporary importance of education and the 
psychological harms of segregation.74  Though Warren’s opinion 
                                                 
68 See Id., at 235-38. 
69 See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941). 
70 See United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938) 
(affording significant deference to the legislature in making economic decisions 
about the safety of shipping certain types of milk across states lines). 
71 Id. at n.4. 
72 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
73 Id. at 489. 
74 Id. at 491 n.11 (citing psychological studies that show segregation led to 
inferiority complexes among black schoolchildren). 
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rested on the uniqueness of education, the Court in short order and 
by a series of laconic per curiam opinions extended the 
constitutional prohibition on segregation to buses, public beaches, 
and municipal golf courses.75  All this left some legal liberals 
pleased with these patently noble outcomes but worried about their 
legality.  Most famously, and to many infamously, Professor 
Herbert Wechsler pondered publicly whether the cases, whose 
results he applauded, could be squared with a commitment to any 
“neutral principles” of constitutional law.76 
 Of course this same skepticism has dogged the Court and 
its students ever since, waxing and waning according to the 
controversy created by the Court’s decisions.  But there is reason 
to believe that the issue has recently grown in prominence and that 
another crisis in confidence may be at hand.  To be sure, the 
twentieth century was a harrowing time for those who believe that 
constitutional law can and should be something more than just 
politics.  But so far the twenty-first century has been even worse. 
 In this regard the decade got off to a terrible start when  
five conservative Justices embraced a novel equal protection 
argument in the service of resolving, in their favor, the deep and 
enduring dispute over the 2000 presidential election.77  As bad as 
this was, it was further exacerbated by the remarkably partisan 
response of the legal academy.78  Steven Calabresi was in splendid 
isolation as the sole demonstrably conservative legal scholar who 
challenged the validity of what the Court had done.79 
                                                 
75 See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 
350 U.S 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). 
76 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1959). 
77 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
78 See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a 
Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 386 (2001) (noting that “the 
voluminous commentary on Bush v. Gore [] mirrored the Court’s ideological 
split”). 
79 See id.; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional 
Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 342 
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 But this was only the beginning.  After one relatively quiet 
term, the Court in June 2003 splintered over two of the more 
divisive political issues of the day -- homosexuality80 and 
affirmative action.81  In both instances, the opinions for the Court 
said relatively little about constitutional text, ratification-era 
history, or precedent, not surprisingly as these traditional tools of 
constitutional law either shed little light on the matter or 
affirmatively contradicted the majority’s resolution of the issue.82  
Not surprisingly, the cases provoked unusually lengthy and 
passionate dissents.83  As with Bush v. Gore,84 the academic 
response was similarly polarized and apparently aligned with the 
authorial ideology.85 
 In June 2005, the Court handed down two rulings that, 
rather bizarrely, approved a public display of the Ten 
Commandments in Texas but disallowed the same in Kentucky.86  
Only one Justice saw any difference between the two cases, but 
given the conflict on the Court concerning its Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, that was sufficient for different results.87  
Then, without overruling its 2000 decision invalidating Nebraska’s 
                                                                                                             
(2005) (citing Calabresi as a prominent conservative who criticized Bush v. 
Gore). 
80 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
81 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
82 Of course, Lawrence expressly overruled the precedent most clearly on point.  
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573  (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 
(1986)).  In Grutter both the majority and the dissent claimed the advantage of 
precedent.  Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322, with id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting). 
83 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
84 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
85 Compare, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1447 
(2004), with Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philospher-kings Adopt 
Libertarianism as our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional 
Morality as the Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2004). 
86 Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), with McCreary County v. 
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
87 See supra note 86. 
 23 
ban on so-called “partial-birth” abortions,88 seven years and two 
new Justices later the Court sustained a remarkably similar federal 
law.89  The academic response was largely one of shock and 
incredulity.90 
 Later that same term, the Justices fought fiercely over the 
rightful legacy of Brown v. Bd. of Ed..91  In Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District,92 the Court, via a 
plurality opinion by the Chief Justice, invalidated race-based pupil 
assignment regimes in two public school systems.  Circling Justice 
Kennedy’s decisive but vague concurrence in the result,93 the 
plurality and the dissents accused one another of disrespecting the 
true meaning of the half-century-old canonical case.94  Justice 
Stevens took the extraordinary step of ending his dissent with the 
pointed declaration that  
 
The Court has changed significantly [in the three 
previous decades].  It was then more faithful to 
Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it 
is today.   It is my firm conviction that no Member 
of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed 
with today’s decision.95 
 
                                                 
88 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
89 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
90 See Pushaw, supra  note 9, at 567 (asserting that “[m]ost commentators agreed 
that Gonzales took a large step in the direction of eventually overruling Roe” 
and that “[p]ro-choice advocates viewed this development with trepidation, 
while pro-life supporters welcomed it”). 
91 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
92 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
93 Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
94 Compare id. at 746 (plurality) (“when it comes to using race to assign children 
to schools, history will be heard”), with id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that “[t]o invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise 
of Brown”). 
95 Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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While this claim can be read different ways, it certainly calls into 
question the current Court’s institutional dedication to the rule of 
law. 
 In June 2008, in what was perhaps its most 
jurisprudentially significant ruling of the decade, the Court went 
bitterly into the final frontier of constitutional interpretation -- the 
Second Amendment.  In District of Columbia v. Heller,96 a bare 
five-Justice majority concluded that the Amendment protected an 
individual right and invalidated the District’s handgun ban.  The 
case stimulated intense passions, both on and off the Court, in the 
latter context even among such stalwart conservatives as Judges 
Wilkinson and Posner.97  Critics accused the Court’s conservative 
members of precisely the sort of judicial activism they had long 
reviled when in dissent.98  Of course these tensions were inflamed 
anew when the Court, again in a 5-4 ruling, extended the rule of 
Heller to state and local governments.99 
 The Court had hardly avoided political controversy in the 
meantime.  In February 2010 the Court decided Citizens United v. 
FEC,100 which expressly overruled one precedent and part of 
another on the way to invalidating the 2002 federal statutory 
restrictions on corporation and union expenditures for speech 
calculated to influence imminent federal elections.101  Justice 
Stevens, writing one of the last dissents of his career, was nearly 
apoplectic.102  The case earned President Obama’s rebuke in his 
                                                 
96 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
97 See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun 
Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/defense-looseness; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of 
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling of the Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 
(2009). 
98 See supra note 97. 
99 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
100 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct 876 (2010). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ruling threatens to 
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”). 
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first State of the Union address, which in turn provoked a much 
ballyhooed inaudible but unmistakable “not true” from the 
attending Justice Alito.103  The ruling was extraordinarily 
unpopular,104 and was perceived by many as at best naive and at 
worst in the partisan service of the Republican party, which likely 
had the most to gain from virtually unlimited corporate spending in 
federal elections.105  The timing of the ruling maximized its effect 
on the 2010 congressional elections,106 and the decision may have 
played a role in last fall’s Republican resurgence. 
 One need not conclude that all, or even any, of these cases 
were wrongly decided to recognize that the cumulative effect of so 
many sharply divided rulings on some of the most politically 
divisive issues of our time is to further politicize the Court and 
constitutional law.  Indeed, commentators representing a wide 
array perspectives have so noted.  Judge Posner devoted the unique 
opportunity afforded by his Harvard Law Review “Foreword” to 
explaining in mathematical and merciless detail why he had 
concluded that the Supreme Court was “A Political Court.”107  
Conservative scholars have long decried the Court’s politicization 
of constitutional law.108  And the experience of first the Rehnquist 
                                                 
103 See Shannen W. Coffin, “Not True” – With its Citizens United Decision, the 
Supreme Court Struck a Blow for Freedom of Speech, NATIONAL REVIEW, Feb. 
22, 2010, at 12. 
104 See Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed., Is it All About Scalia, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, 
April 15, 2010, at B7. 
105 See Dan Eggen & Ben Pershing, Democrats Scramble After Campaign 
Ruling, Corporate Purse Strings May Be Tough to Tighten as Midterms 
Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2010, at A1. 
106 See High Court Ruling Leaves States Scrambling to Close Gaps on Spending 
Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2010, at 12; Court Ruling on Election 
Spending Expected, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2010, at 2; Eggen & Pershing, 
supra note 105, at A1. 
107 Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32 
(2005).  To be sure, he thought this state of affairs to some extent inevitable, but 
he also urged a more “modest” approach than had prevailed in recent rulings.  
Id. at 54-60. 
108 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).  See also 
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and now the Roberts Courts has provoked similar protests from 
more liberal quarters.109    
 It would take far more space than the essay format allows 
to thoroughly canvass just the relatively recent legal literature 
decrying the politicization of the modern Supreme Court and 
modern constitutional law, so the rather random sampling set forth 
in the notes will have to suffice.  But one principle should emerge 
from any fair overview, however cursory, and that is that this 
frustration is not limited to any part of the political spectrum.110   
Rather there is a consensus emerging from all quarters that it is 
increasingly difficult to take modern constitutional law, at least as 
articulated by the Supreme Court, all that seriously.111  Even Brian 
Tamanaha, whose refreshing call upon the profession and 
especially the legal academy to recover a “more balanced realism” 
in no small part inspired the present piece writes off constitutional 
law as a lost cause.112 
 Not surprisingly the growing equation of constitutional law 
with raw political will has worked an increasing corruption of the 
process for nominating and confirming federal judges, most 
acutely at the federal courts of appeals level.113  Of course the 
                                                                                                             
Pushaw, supra note , at (collecting examples); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential 
Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 n.6, 1539 & n.9 (2000) 
(citing articles attacking Casey as an unprincipled surrender to political 
expedience). 
109 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); William P. Marshall, 
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1217 (2002).  See also Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23.  
110 Compare supra note 108, with supra note 109. 
111 See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 90, at 527 (describing a “decades-long 
movement that has rendered the process and substance of constitutional decision 
making almost indistinguishable from simple politics”). 
112 See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 164. 
113 See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 90, at 588 (“Not surprisingly, the merger of 
constitutional law with raw politics has corrupted the judicial appointment 
process, especially at the Supreme Court level.”).  To be sure, the problem is not 
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Supreme Court appointment process has not been immune from 
this corruption.114  Finally, the ACA cases themselves reflect the 
acuteness of the present need for constitutional forbearance.  The 
public reaction to them has generally assumed that the division 
among the lower courts is explainable by the judges’ various 
partisan sympathies and that this division will continue as the cases 
progress up the federal judicial latter.115 
 
III.  “Obamacare” As Constitutional Opportunity 
 
 The foregoing history of constitutional forbearance and the 
acuteness of the present need for more of the same provide a 
context for fully appreciating the potentially enormous, long-term 
significance of judicial rulings on the constitutionality of the 
individual health insurance mandate.  Sadly, the possibility of 
judicial unanimity is already behind us.  But even so, an 
extraordinary opportunity both to conjure and illustrate a 
separation between our constitutional law and our politics remains.  
It is the opportunity for the exercise of constitutional forbearance.  
This part both identifies some of the reasons this is true and 
explores ways in which that opportunity might be fulfilled or 
squandered. 
 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY 
 
The central substantive constitutional issue raised in the 
litigation concerning the ACA is whether the Commerce Clause, 
alone or as aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants 
Congress power to enact the health insurance individual 
                                                                                                             
a new one.  See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: 
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994). 
114 See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 181-84; see also supra note 113. 
115 See infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 28 
mandate.116  One would be hard pressed to find an area of the law 
more notoriously indeterminate and subject to political 
manipulation than the Court’s current Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, which one leading commentator has declared 
“analytical chaos.”117  Accordingly, any claim that a federal statute 
“clearly” exceeds Congress’s power under these clauses ought to, 
and ordinarily is, met with skepticism.  Moreover, this claim is 
unusually untenable when made with respect to the ACA’s 
individual mandate.         
 
1.  The Case for Congressional Power 
 
All agree that the federal government is one of enumerated 
and therefore limited powers.118  Two clauses in Article I, section 8 
are most obviously relevant to the question whether Congress has 
the power to enact the individual mandate.  The first accords 
Congress power “to regulate Commerce . . . Among the Several 
States.”119   The second authorizes Congress to “to make all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp. 2d 882, 891-95 
(E.D. Mich. 2010); Florida ex. rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Serv.,  716 F.Supp. 2d 1120, 1162  (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
117 Pushaw, supra note 90, at 579 (“For instance, the Court [has] declared that 
Congress cannot interfere with areas of ‘traditional state concern,’ such as crime 
and education, but did not explain why it had allowed Congress to pass over 
3,000 criminal laws and establish a Department of Education.”). 
118  See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 
891 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“In the body of jurisprudence interpreting the 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has set out a three-prong analysis to 
determine if a federal law properly falls within this enumerated grant of 
authority.”); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 
780 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Despite the laudable intentions of Congress in enacting a 
comprehensive and transformative health care regime, the legislative process 
must still operate within constitutional bounds. Salutatory goals and creative 
drafting have never been sufficient to offset an absence of enumerated 
powers.”). 
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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its power over interstate commerce (and all other powers the 
Constitution vests in the federal government).120 
Considering first the congressional power to regulate 
commerce, what is “Commerce” for these purposes?  Whatever 
may be the outer boundaries of this term, more than six decades 
ago the Supreme Court held that the business of insurance was 
“commerce” within the meaning of Article I, section 8.  In United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n,121 the Court observed 
that “[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its 
activities across state lines ha[d] been held to be wholly beyond the 
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause” and 
expressly declined the invitation to “make an exception of the 
business of insurance.”122  As Harvard law professor and Reagan 
Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried recently observed, 
“the law has not departed from th[at] conclusion for a moment 
since” this 1944 ruling.123  And although South-Eastern 
Underwriters concerned fire insurance, nowhere in all the 
Obamacare litigation’s voluminous filings is it contended that the 
holding of that case does not extend to health insurance. Similarly, 
all the litigants and jurists in these cases, however vigorously they 
dispute other questions, are nevertheless in complete agreement 
that the health insurance industry is one that bestrides state lines 
like a colossus.    
Once it is acknowledged that health insurance is interstate 
“Commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, 
Congress then enjoys plenary power, under well settled precedent, 
to “prescribe the rule to govern” the conduct of that enterprise.  As 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote nearly two centuries ago, Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause 
 
                                                 
120 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
121 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
122 322 U.S. at 553. 
123 Hearing on the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 2, 2011) (statement of Charles Fried, 
Beneficial Professor, Harvard Law School). 
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is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the 
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This 
power, like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other 
than are prescribed in the constitution.  . . . .  If, 
as has always been understood, the sovereignty 
of Congress, though limited to specified objects, 
is plenary as to those objects, the power over 
commerce . . . among the several States, is vested 
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a 
single government, having in its constitution the 
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as 
are found in the constitution of the United 
States.124 
 
In short, Congress has the power to make the rules as to how the 
health insurance business is to operate.  The bookend requirements 
that health insurers not refuse coverage to persons with pre-
existing conditions and that individuals not wait until there are sick 
to apply for health insurance are rules governing the conduct of the 
health insurance business, and therefore appear to be well within 
the ambit of congressional authority.  The case for congressional 
power to enact the mandate is strikingly plain and straightforward, 
far more so than the case for congressional power to enact 
numerous other provisions in the U.S. code.  The point is not that 
the individual mandate is patently constitutional and all arguments 
to the contrary border on frivolity, though to be sure several other 
distinguished commentators have so concluded.125  For present 
purposes it suffices to show, as the foregoing presentation has, that 
the case for congressional power can be made under well settled 
Supreme Court precedents.  It hardly requires heavy lifting for a 
                                                 
124 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824). 
125 See, e.g., Hearing on the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 2, 2011) (statement of Charles 
Fried, Beneficial Professor, Harvard Law School). 
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federal judge to sustain the constitutionality of the individual 
mandate.   
But even if there were a weak link hidden somewhere in 
this chain of reasoning, an alternative argument independently 
supports congressional power.  For, even if the individual mandate 
were not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the 
Commerce Clause, Congress would in any event have sufficient 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose it.  That 
clause, among other things, grants Congress power to enact any 
regulation, not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution, that can 
be deemed “‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity.’”126  Put differently, “where Congress has the authority to 
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every 
power needed to make that regulation effective.’”127  This power 
extends even to intrastate, non-economic matters.128  Furthermore, 
in considering whether a non-economic, intrastate regulation is 
“essential” to the success of a larger regulatory scheme, the Court 
does not evaluate the relationship independently.  Rather, “[t]he 
relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are 
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power.”129  It is sufficient that Congress “could 
reasonably conclude”130 that its broader regulatory scheme would 
be undercut absent the supplemental regulation of even a wholly 
intrastate and non-economic matter. 
With respect to the ACA’s individual mandate, it would be 
difficult to conclude otherwise.  The mandate was an indispensable 
corollary to the Act’s most fundamental industry reform. 
                                                 
126 Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
127 Id. (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 
(1942)). 
128 Id. at 37. 
129 Id. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). 
130 Id. at 42. 
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A principal justification for the Act was that millions of 
Americans lacked health insurance.131  Moreover, their number 
was growing at an alarming rate.132  Many Americans had lost their 
insurance after changing jobs.133  Because health insurance in the 
U.S. has for decades been a benefit provided most permanent 
employees, a change in employers frequently also meant a change 
in health insurers.  But health insurance companies increasingly 
declined to insure persons with pre-existing conditions or offered 
such persons coverage only at exorbitant rates.134  The growing 
population of uninsured and practically uninsurable Americans 
presented Congress with a compelling humanitarian dilemma.135  
But Congress also confronted a severe threat to the long-term 
health of the economy.136  The uninsurable were often therefore 
practically unemployable and, in any event, were at grave risk of 
bankruptcy and poverty.137  This economic dislocation, in addition 
to imposing an awesome toll of human suffering, also produced 
ripple effects throughout the broader economy.  When joined with 
the specter of exponentially increasing healthcare costs, the purely 
economic consequences of the healthcare status quo ante required 
                                                 
131 Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Keeps Up Health Care Push, 
Citing Uninsured, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/09/11/us/politics/11obama.html?pagewanted=1. 
132 Id. (citing that during the recent recession, as many as six million more 
Americans have lost their health insurance). 
133 Josh Gerstein, Obama Pitches to Insured Americans, POLITICO, July 22, 
2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25296.html. 
134 Jeff Mason & Matt Spetalnick, Obama Says Insurance Companies Holding 
U.S. Hostage, REUTERS, Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2009/08/14/us-usa-healthcare-obama-idUSTRE57D47P20090814. 
135 Lisa Wangsness & Susan Milligan, ‘The time for bickering is over:' Obama 
Urges Congress to Overhaul Health Care, Spells Out Details, Denounces 
Misrepresentations, Evokes Kennedy's Moral Stance, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
10, 2009, at 1. 
136 Michael A. Fletcher, Obama Prods Congress to Reform Health, Saying 
Window Could Close, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 19, 2009, at A06. 
137 James Oliphant & Kim Geiger, Plenty of Healthcare Aches and Pains, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at A17 (citing a Harvard University study, which found 
that an American family files for a medical bankruptcy once every 90 seconds). 
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congressional action to prevent a crippling economic crisis.  Or so 
Congress reasonably concluded.138 
Congress responded by, among other things, sharply 
circumscribing the ability of insurance companies to deny 
coverage or charge differential rates on the basis of applicants’ pre-
existing conditions.139  The power of Congress to impose these 
restrictions on the multi-billion dollar, interstate health insurance  
industry is beyond reasonable debate, and in fact has not even been 
questioned in any of the cases challenging the constitutionality of 
the ACA.140  But once one acknowledges congressional power to 
enact these restrictions, then the power to enact the individual 
mandate follows as night follows day.  The prohibitions on insurer 
discrimination against applicants with pre-existing conditions 
would, if enacted alone, create a perverse incentive to defer 
purchasing health insurance unless and until seriously ill.141  
Health insurance would be only for the sick and the paranoid.  
Hence, the Act’s requirement that most everybody buy health 
insurance beginning in 2014.   Even if the mandate cannot standing 
alone be justified as a regulation of interstate commerce, and for 
the reasons set forth above it likely can, it nonetheless is within 
Congress’s independent power, under the Necessary and Proper 
                                                 
138 See Thomas More Law Center, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (Congress had a 
rational basis to conclude that in the aggregate, decisions to forego insurance 
coverage and attempt to pay for health care out of pocket drive up the cost of 
insurance). 
139 As part of the ACA, Congress passed the Pre-Existing Condition Insurance 
Plan (PCIP,) which will prohibit insurance companies from discriminating 
against health care consumers based on pre-existing conditions.  Those reforms 
were enacted immediately for children under 19, and will extend to all 
Americans beginning in 2014.  For more information, see 
http://www.healthcare.gov/news/blog/tags/pre-existing_conditions.html. 
140 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., No. 
3:10-cv-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *26 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (acknowledging 
Congress’s power to regulate the health care industry). 
141 See Thomas More Law Center, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (“Without the 
minimum coverage provision, there would be an incentive for some individuals 
to wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care, knowing that 
insurance would be available at all times”). 
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Clause, to make its other regulations of Commerce (here, the 
prohibitions on denying coverage because of an applicant’s pre-
existing conditions) effective. 
These restrictions are precisely the kind of “regulatory 
scheme that could be undercut”142 absent a health-insurance 
mandate.  Not only was it reasonable for Congress to conclude that 
an ex ante mandate to purchase health insurance was essential to a 
regulatory scheme that included ex post prohibitions on 
discrimination against applicants because of pre-existing 
conditions, but indeed this conclusion may have been the only 
reasonable one.143  In any event, congressional concern that the 
prohibitions on discrimination against applicants with pre-existing 
conditions would endanger the private health insurance industry 
absent a purchase mandate cannot be dismissed as unreasonable. 
Once again, it is not necessary to conclude that this chain of 
reasoning sweeps away all contrary considerations.  But the 
analysis should make clear that existing Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence readily supplied the tools to build a case for the 
ACA, including the individual mandate. 
                 
2.  The Case Against Congressional Power 
 
How then to explain the fact that two federal judges have 
held that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority?  
The case against the constitutionality of the Act depends upon a 
distinction between activity and inactivity.  The Act’s litigation 
opponents have argued that the individual mandate regulates 
inactivity, because it penalizes the individual for simply doing 
                                                 
142 Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
143Certainly the fit between the mandate and the coverage provisions is at least 
as tight as the connection between non-commercial, intrastate medical marijuana 
possessed in accordance with state law and the federal effort to eliminate the 
interstate market in the drug for recreational purposes.  But the latter 
relationship was deemed sufficient to authorize a federal criminal prohibition on 
the possession of any amount of marijuana, anywhere in the United States for 
any purpose, regardless of its source.  See generally Raich, 545 U.S. at 1. 
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nothing.144  As the Act’s defenders have noted in response, given 
the undeniable frailty of this mortal coil and existing practices 
(including some legal requirements) that all those in our borders 
and in dire need of medical care receive it, it is far from clear that 
declining to purchase health insurance can really be characterized 
as doing nothing.145  By failing to take the responsible step of 
providing a means to pay for the potentially catastrophically 
expensive care one may in the future need and receive, the 
individual who foregoes health insurance in fact acts in reliance on 
society as a form of insurance.146 
Regardless, as interesting as these semantic distinctions 
may be, it is ultimately unnecessary to resolve them to pass upon 
the legal challenge to healthcare reform.  Even if the individual 
mandate is best understood as a regulation of inactivity, that does 
not inevitably mean it is unconstitutional.  The two decisions 
striking down the requirement labeled such a regulation of 
inactivity as “unprecedented.”  To be sure, if that label is a fair 
one147 this means that no controlling legal authority requires a 
lower federal court to sustain the law against constitutional 
challenge.  But of course it likewise means that no controlling legal 
authority dooms the law to invalidation.148  The truly disinterested 
                                                 
144 See Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp 2d at 772. 
145 See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015, 2010 WL 4860299, at 
*12 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). (discussing government’s argument that the 
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147 According to the government, and two of the courts that have already ruled 
on the ACA, it is not at all clear that the individual mandate is truly 
unprecedented activity.  See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-9502010, 2011 WL 
611139, at *19 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court has 
upheld Congress’s authority to regulate the health care industry, and that it is 
unique from other industries); see, e.g., Mead at *18 (court held that there is no 
distinction between activity and inactivity).  Even if the individual mandate is 
accepted as unprecedented, that, by itself, does not render the legislation 
unconstitutional.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
148  Even if the individual mandate is accepted as unprecedented, that, by itself, 
does not render the legislation unconstitutional.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
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judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law, be left in 
equipoise, with little or no guidance as to how to resolve the 
controversy.  And as others have trenchantly observed, it is far 
from clear why even inactivity that, when considered in context, 
undermines a regulatory scheme crafted in response to a genuine 
threat to the nation’s economic well being should be immune from 
congressional authority.149 
At its core, the case against the Act relies chiefly upon the 
claim that a decision upholding the mandate will permit Congress 
virtually unlimited authority under the Commerce Clause.  It is 
argued that if Congress can compel the individual to buy health 
insurance, then Congress must also have to the power to compel 
individuals to buy and even (gasp!) eat broccoli, or other noxiously 
nutritious fare.  The individual mandate is characterized as a first 
step onto to a “slippery slope” that leads ineluctably to the demise 
of the Constitution’s central design by which the federal 
government was confined to enumerated, and therefore limited, 
powers. 
These arguments have rhetorical strength, which is why 
they have prevailed in two of the five district courts to rule on the 
constitutional issue.  But upon closer examination they are less 
than compelling.  As an initial matter, contemporary claims about 
threats to the enumerated powers scheme call urgently for closing 
the barn door about seventy years after the horse escaped.  In the 
wake of the New Deal constitutional crisis, the Supreme Court 
effectively abdicated any meaningful role in the enforcement of the 
limits imposed upon Congress by the Constitution’s enumeration 
of its powers.150  To be sure, the Courts decisions in United States 
v. Lopez151 and United States v. Morrison152 kindled hopes of a 
revival, albeit it a narrow one, of this judicial prerogative. 
                                                 
149 See Hearing on the Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Before the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Feb 2, 2011) (statement of Charles Fried, 
Beneficial Professor, Harvard Law School). 
150 See generally MCAFFEE, supra note 66, at 143-61 (discussing judicial efforts 
to enforce the enumerated powers scheme in the 1930s). 
151 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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But to whatever extent these hopes were reasonable, they 
were dashed by the Court’s 2005 ruling in Raich v. Gonzales.153 
There, the Rehnquist Court, in one of its final constitutional 
decisions, recognized congressional authority to prohibit 
possession of any amount of marijuana, anywhere in the United 
States for any purpose, regardless of its source.154  In dissent, 
Justice Thomas aptly characterized Raich as supplying yet another 
epitaph for judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme: 
“Diane Monson and Angel Raich use marijuana that has never 
been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has 
had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana.  
If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it 
can regulate virtually anything -- and the Federal Government is no 
longer one of limited and enumerated powers.”155  The Court’s 
ruling in Raich cannot be dismissed as an isolated misstep.  Rather, 
Raich was part of a century-old pattern of conservative judges 
marching forward federalism principles when Congress does 
something they do not like, and then conveniently forgetting them 
when Congress does something they do like.156  Of course a 
selectively invoked federalism is, in fact, not federalism at all.  It is 
instead a tool for jurists to dismantle laws they do not like for other 
reasons, leaving intact laws equally obnoxious to federalism 
principles that they happen to believe salutary, empowering them 
                                                                                                             
152 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
153 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
154 See generally id. 
155 Id. at 34 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas added that according to the 
majority’s opinion, “the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, 
clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States.  This makes a 
mockery of Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the ‘powers 
delegated’ to the Federal Government are ‘few and defined,’ while those of the 
States are ‘numerous and indefinite.’  One searches the Court's opinion in vain 
for any hint of what aspect of American life is reserved to the States.   Id. at 34-
35 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed.  
1961).  
156 See generally Bryant, supra note 52, at 101. 
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to pick and choose among federal statutes on a basis they never 
need articulate let alone defend. 
Even if that context were ignored, however, the claim that a 
decision upholding the individual mandate would in turn become a 
precedent for unlimited congressional authority fails on its own 
terms.  The argument ignores the possibility of ruling narrowly 
confined to the peculiar circumstances giving rise to the ACA.  A 
recognition of congressional power to mandate that citizens enter 
into qualifying private health insurance transactions would not, as 
the Act’s constitutional opponents have maintained, necessitate the 
conclusion that Congress could likewise mandate innumerable 
other private transactions, such as the purchase of gym 
memberships, automobiles, or even the dreaded broccoli.157  
Healthcare is an unusual if not unique good, in that the need for it 
is often sudden, unexpected, and life-threatening.158  Moreover, in 
many such cases the needed care is catastrophically expensive.159  
Finally, no mortal individual can ever be certain that she will not in 
the future develop such a need for overwhelmingly expensive 
care.160 
None of this can be said about gym memberships, 
automobiles, or leafy green vegetables.161  The distinctive nature of 
the healthcare and health insurance markets matters because it 
affords a basis for limiting the reach of any judicial ruling 
sustaining the constitutionality of the ACA.  A court could leave 
                                                 
157 See Florida ex rel. Bondi, at *24 (asserting that the logical extreme of the 
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undecided whether Congress could mandate the purchase of 
automobiles,162 say in order to stimulate a recovery in the auto 
industry, for the unlikely day Congress attempts to do so.  Were 
that case ever to arise, it would present a genuinely open question, 
as the fit between that purchase mandate and whatever perceived 
problem prompted the law simply would not be the same as that 
relied upon to sustain the ACA. 
Upholding the ACA would, to be sure, require the Court to 
abandon the mythical absolute bar on congressional regulation of 
inactivity under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  But it would not of its own force bestow upon Congress a 
wide-ranging authority to mandate private purchases.  Were the 
ACA found constitutional, notwithstanding its regulation of 
“inactivity,” this conclusion would not make the fact that future 
laws also regulated inactivity irrelevant the constitutional inquiry.  
The ACA is premised on an extraordinarily strong case that a 
purchase mandate is indispensable to a regulatory regime Congress 
otherwise indisputably has power to enact.163  A court could be 
confident that future assertions of the authority to mandate 
purchases, should they ever present themselves, would not be 
insulated from meaningful constitutional scrutiny by the precedent 
of the ACA. 
Close examination reveals that the consequences of 
upholding the ACA have been greatly exaggerated.164  Moreover, 
                                                 
162 Constitutional scholar Professor Erwin Chemerinsky was asked about 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, and replied that “Congress 
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as noted above, the worst that can be said about the law is that it is 
without precedent, which ultimately means only that no existing 
legal precedent dictates an answer to the constitutional question.  
In this light, the arguments against the validity of the Act are not 
implausible, but neither are they compelling.  At best, the Act’s 
opponents can argue the matter to a stalemate.  The truly 
disinterested judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law, 
be left in equipoise, with little or no guidance from the traditional 
sources of legal authority as to how to resolve the controversy. 
Of course it is in precisely such circumstances that the 
typically negligible pull of constitutional forbearance becomes 
significant.  And the strength of that attraction should turn in part 
on the extent to which the cases have been politicized.  
 
 B.  THE POLITICS OF “OBAMACARE”  
 
 Numerous characteristics of the Obamacare cases coalesce 
to present an almost “perfect storm” of forbearance opportunity.  
The most important is the political salience of the debate over 
Obamacare.  The extraordinary partisanship that has infected the 
ensuing litigation has only exacerbated the political sensitivity of 
the constitutional issue.  In light of this context, the lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate present 
the courts with the most glaring opportunity for meaningful 
constitutional forbearance since the missed opportunity provided 
by the 2000 presidential election.165    
 
  1.  The Bill  
 
 As the moniker “Obamacare” suggests, the ACA has 
become a singularly signal achievement of the first two years of 
                                                 
165 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Pushaw, supra note 9, at 585-
87 (asserting that with Bush v. Gore and the scholarly reaction thereto “[t]he 
politicization of constitutional law had reached its apex”). 
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Obama’s presidency.166  It was enacted after more than a year of 
vigorous congressional, and public, debate that stirred passions like 
little else in the preceding two decades.167  That debate was 
rancorous and, at times, unseemly.168  More to the point, it was 
frequently conducted in apocalyptic terminology.169  It resulted in a 
compromise that fully satisfied few, but that nevertheless was 
promptly hailed as the culmination of three-quarters of a century of 
Democratic efforts.170 
 Healthcare reform was one of the foremost domestic policy 
issues addressed in the 2008 presidential election.171  As a 
candidate, Obama adopted a more moderate position than Hillary 
Clinton, eschewing her proposal that Congress enact a federal 
mandate to purchase health insurance.172  His first few weeks as 
President were consumed by the threat that the worst recession in 
decades would deepen into a depression.173  But the Democratic 
party chose to make healthcare a paramount priority of Obama’s 
first term.174  By the end of March 2009, the chairs of the relevant 
congressional committees, all Democrats, had largely settled on the 
broad contours of legislative reform.175  Few if any anticipated that 
the final vote on the legislation was still a year away. 
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 In June and July, committees in both the House and the 
Senate approved different bills, albeit along strict party-line 
votes.176  During the August recess, congressional town-hall 
meetings became venues for contentious clashes over the proposed 
legislation, at which members of Congress were “shouted down, 
hanged in effigy and taunted” by the bills’ opponents, including 
many affiliated with the emerging “Tea Party.”177  In some 
instances the rudeness ripened into violence, with noisy 
demonstrations leading to “to fistfights, arrests and 
hospitalizations.”178  What initially appeared to be an organic, 
grassroots movement was in fact the product of exhortations by 
prominent conservative commentators such as Sean Hannity, 
Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh.179  Limbaugh went so far as to 
suggest a likeness between the Obama Administration’s healthcare 
logo and a symbol used by the Nazis.180  Several town-hall 
meetings ended in chaos when crowds opposed to the proposed 
legislation succeeded in drowning out the remarks of the 
sponsoring member of Congress.181  Numerous congressional 
Democrats received death threats.182   
 When members of Congress returned from the recess, they 
brought the rancor with them.  Speaking to a joint session of 
Congress, President Obama disclaimed any intent to extend health 
insurance coverage to illegal immigrants.183  In response, South 
Carolina Republican Joe Wilson shouted, “you lie!”184  This 
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extraordinary breach of decorum earned Wilson a formal rebuke 
by the House of Representatives and prompted an extended public 
discussion about the need for civility in political discourse.185  The 
possibility of a bi-partisan effort grew increasingly remote. 
 That fall Democrats finally overrode steadfast Republican 
opposition to pass separate bills in both chambers of Congress.  
Speaker Pelosi cobbled together a fragile coalition of liberals and 
more conservative “Blue Dog” Democrats sufficient to approve the 
House bill by a narrow 220-215 vote on November 7.186  Then, in a 
dramatic Christmas Eve session, the Senate passed its version of 
the bill, defeating a threatened filibuster without the aid of a single 
Republican vote.187  But each bill had yet to pass in the non-
sponsoring chamber.  And the August 2009 death of Senator 
Kennedy ultimately threatened to tip the balance against reform in 
the Senate. 
 In a stunning upset, Scott Brown won the special election 
to fill Kennedy’s Senate seat after a hard-fought campaign in 
which his most salient message was his pledge to vote against 
healthcare reform.188  It appeared that the extended, rancorous, and 
seemingly unprincipled log-rolling in Congress had soured public 
support for the proposed legislation.189  Brown not only captured 
what had for decades been a solidly Democratic seat190 but indeed 
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occupied the place of a liberal icon who made the achievement of 
universal healthcare his life-long objective.191  Conservative 
pundits read in Brown’s election a message from the electorate to 
President Obama that, in pressing for a healthcare overhaul, he had 
misjudged the political tenor of the nation and exceeded his 
mandate.192  Brown even garnered (and embraced) the nickname 
“41,” a reference to the fact that his election provided the 
Republicans just enough votes to maintain a filibuster in the 
Senate.193  Contemporaneous national polls indicated that less than 
40% of Americans approved the Administration’s proposal.194  In 
the wake of Brown’s victory, healthcare reform was widely 
deemed dead.195 
 Rumors of its demise, however, proved to be greatly 
exaggerated.  Faced with the prospect of a filibuster in the Senate, 
Democrats shifted their efforts towards getting the House to 
approve the Senate bill.196  Speaker Pelosi initially reported that 
she lacked the votes.197  But after the promise of changes to 
accommodate the concerns of the most liberal and the most 
conservative Democrats, and a bi-partisan, day-long, televised 
healthcare summit at the White House, majority support in the 
House at last appeared to be within reach.198  Still, Pelosi and the 
President lobbied and cajoled conservative House Democrats for 
their support -- which ultimately proved fatal to some political 
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careers -- until the eve of the scheduled floor vote.199  Particularly 
difficult to resolve were controversies concerning the legislation’s 
treatment of the ever volatile issue of abortion.200  Just hours 
before the vote, the last holdout, Bart Stupak of Michigan, pledged 
his support in exchange for the President’s promise to promulgate 
a clarifying executive order prohibiting federal payment for 
abortions.201  The final vote in the House was 219 in favor and 212 
opposed.202  On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, President Obama 
signed into law the ACA -- the first major legislation in 
generations to be enacted without a single Republican vote.203 
 In short, the ACA reflected the settlement of a year-long, 
deeply divisive, and profoundly partisan legislative ground war 
over the structure of a multi-billion-dollar industry.  Not since the 
Civil and Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s had federal legislation 
emerged from a similar crucible.204  This legislative history alone 
should give prudent pause to judges called upon now to undo that 
pact.  Moreover, the unparalleled acrimony and duration of the 
healthcare debate make it unusually difficult for judges, no less 
than their fellow citizens, to avoid feeling a vested allegiance 
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either for or against the law.  In any event, as it turned out, 
however, the Act’s political problems were just beginning.   
 
  2.  The Statute 
 
 From the moment of enactment, repeal became a lodestar 
for the Republican party.205  Support for the legislation became a 
defining issue of the 2010 congressional elections, with  
Republicans targeting vulnerable Democrats in swing districts.206  
The strategy proved successful.207  Republicans took control of the 
House and reduced the Democratic margin of majority in the 
Senate.208  President Obama famously dubbed the 2010 
congressional elections “a shellacking.”209  The new Speaker of the 
House, John Boehner of West Chester, Ohio, promptly announced 
his intention to seek repeal of the law, which he labeled “a 
monstrosity.”  Good to his word the first action taken by the new 
House, after a public reading of the Constitution, was to vote to 
repeal the ACA.210 
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 Of course the vote was largely symbolic, as the matter was 
sure to die in the Senate, which it did.211  Boehner has also 
threatened to block all funding to carry the law into effect, though 
that remains to be seen.212  Thus, notwithstanding the March 2010 
legislative victory, healthcare reform very much remains a leading 
and dynamic issue.  Only a few weeks into the 112th Congress it 
became clear that the Democrats could not reenact the ACA if they 
had to but neither could the Republicans effect a repeal.  This 
legislative stalemate is certain to become one of a very few 
defining issues in the 2012 presidential election.     
 
  3.  The Litigation            
 
 Within hours of the President’s signing of the ACA, a 
coalition of partisan, elected state attorneys general and private 
parties -- led by Bill McCollum, the Republican Attorney General 
of Florida who was then a candidate for governor -- challenged the 
constitutionality of the law in federal court.213  The case was 
brought in Pensacola, which was thought likely, with good reason 
it turns out, to assign a judge inclined to offer a sympathetic 
hearing.  This filing was accompanied by press releases and 
conferences obviously aimed at deflecting at least some of the 
Democrats glory and clouding the media message for the day.  
Over the next few weeks, numerous additional suits were brought 
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA.  Seven states have 
taken the extraordinary step of enacting state statutes or adopting 
state constitutional amendments purporting to preclude 
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enforcement of the ACA.214  Both the litigation and the state 
statutes were then widely seen as largely symbolic.  The statutes 
were patently invalid under the Supremacy Clause, and most 
commentators thought little more of the lawsuits, which were 
decried as hallow publicity stunts.215    
 In these suits, the plaintiffs raised a broad array of 
arguments.  The Courts uniformly rejected nearly all these claims 
as legally groundless.  To the surprise of many, however, two 
district court judges ultimately determined that Congress lacked 
power to impose the individual mandate.  The first, Judge Hudson 
of the eastern district of Virginia, severed the mandate from the 
rest of the massive law.  The second, Judge Vinson, who sits in the 
northern district of Florida where the first suit was filed, 
invalidated the law in its entirety, though he later stayed his ruling 
and allowed implementation efforts to go forward pending appeal 
of his decision.  These and other district court rulings now wait 
review in the federal appeals courts. 
 The opinions of Judges Hudson and Vinson, and indeed of 
all the judges to reach the merits, acknowledged the extraordinarily 
divisive and partisan nature of the process leading to the law’s 
enactment.  They also expressly disclaimed that their decisions in 
any way reflected their views about the wisdom of the law.  That 
all the judges reaching the merits found it necessary to state this 
proposition, which in most cases is taken for granted, 
unconsciously echoed Justice Owen Roberts’s notorious 
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characterization of judicial review as mechanical in his discredited 
opinion for the Court in United States v. Butler.216  Then, as now, it 
might be thought that the judges “doth protest too much.”217 
The inclusion of disclaimers such as these also reflected the 
judges’ expectations that their opinions would soon be made 
fodder for mass media.  In this expectation they could not have 
been disappointed.  Few district court rulings merit discussion by 
the President during his pre-Super-Bowl television interview.218   
But of course, the district court decisions were themselves only 
initial steps along the federal judicial path, and all such roads lead 
to the Supreme Court.  Talking heads, pundits of all stripes, and 
even a few legal scholars were not in the least shy about predicting 
the likely division of the Justices on the issue.219  
 The extent to which Justice Kagan should recuse herself 
from cases due to her involvement with them while Solicitor 
General has proven unusually contentious and garnered 
disproportionate attention, which some have attributed to the 
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possibility that her presence or absence might be decisive in a High 
Court test of the ACA.220 
 The timing of the litigation continues to exacerbate its 
political impact.221  If, as is expected, the various appeals are given 
priority in the courts of appeals, the matter is on course for a 
Supreme Court ruling in June of 2012.222 A decision at that date, 
and especially one invalidating the law, would undoubtedly figure 
prominently in the nationwide discussion leading to the fall 
presidential election.223  Worse, the Justices’ opinions could be 
crafted with that end in mind.  It might even be unrealistic to think 
that the Justices would not take into account their opinions’ 
potential value as partisan sound-bites.224 
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 Hence, nearly everything about the manner in which these 
cases have been litigated, decided, and reported on by the press 
suggests that they threaten to turn the federal judiciary into a 
political football.  To do so would, of course, further politicize this 
theoretically apolitical branch of government and further erode 
whatever difference remains between constitutional law and 
partisan politics.  Yet while these cases present the risk of 
exacerbating these trends, they also present opportunity for the 
judiciary to do much to reverse them.  How they might do so is 
discussed below.    
 
 C.  What Forbearance Would Look Like 
 
 Each additional judicial opinion by a Republican-appointed 
judge against the constitutionality of the individual mandate 
bolsters the claim that the results in important constitutional cases 
turn more on political preferences than on law.  So the best thing 
the federal judiciary can do is to stop issuing such opinions.  Harm 
has already been done by the two district court decisions 
invalidating the law.  But if they are reversed on appeal, and the 
appellate courts are unanimous in upholding the law, that harm 
will be contained.  In such circumstances, the Supreme Court could 
simultaneously avoid committing itself on the issue and stay out of 
the fray by simply declining to exercise jurisdiction,225 an act 
requiring no explanation and of no precedential significance.226   
 But if indeed past is prologue, at least one circuit court will 
eventually rule against the constitutionality of the law, which will 
in effect force the Supreme Court to decide the matter.227  Once 
there, unanimity would again be ideal.  It is also extremely 
unlikely.  Justice Thomas has since Lopez consistently called for 
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the abandonment of the substantial effects test and a return to an 
understanding of the Commerce Clause more in keeping with that 
of the 1780s.228  For present purposes, the key word is 
“consistently.”  This means that his vote will do little or no harm to 
the notion that constitutional law is more than just politics.  By 
repeatedly adhering to his narrow understanding of federal 
legislative power in the face of what must  have mighty 
temptations to yield to his contrary policy preferences,229 Justice 
Thomas has earned the right to vote to strike down “Obamacare.”  
No fair assessment of his record on congressional power would 
dismiss such a vote as mere politics. 
 The same cannot be said for any of his conservative 
brethren.  All four of them have in recent years strayed from their 
federalism vows,230 and their purported discovery of an inflexible 
commitment to them when ruling on “Obamacare” would fool 
none but the foolhardy.  Accordingly, to be truly efficacious as an 
act of constitutional forbearance, the Roberts Court must not only 
uphold the ACA but do so by an 8-1 margin.  The significance of 
the Court’s forbearance would be dissipated to the extent that less 
steadfast friends of strict limits on federal power choose this case 
to join Justice Thomas.  And, while marginally better than a ruling 
invalidating the law, a 5-4 decision upholding the law would 
merely confirm the many predictions that the        Justices would 
divide along partisan lines with the most moderate conservative, 
Justice Kennedy, casting the deciding vote.231  
 
 D.  Forbearance is not Abdication    
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 One person’s constitutional forbearance might be another’s 
political cowardice.  In this light, it is worth asking whether there 
exists a category of cases in which the kinds of societal and 
institutional considerations that forbearance serves should play 
little or no role whatsoever in a judge’s thinking? 
      The most compelling candidate would be the category of cases 
in which the judiciary alone could realistically be expected to act 
impartially. One of the most significant theories of modern 
constitutional law articulated in the last half of the twentieth 
century was set forth in John Hart Ely’s seminal Democracy and 
Distrust.232  In that book he argued, among other things, that much 
of modern constitutional law could best be understood as reflecting 
the Court’s intuitions about when ordinary political processes were 
trustworthy and when systemic problems suggested that they were 
not.  In the latter cases, it was argued, the Court intervened either 
to clear away a barrier to the healthy functioning of the political 
process,233 or failing that, to correct errors the political process 
itself could never adequately address.234  This is no place to take 
up a general evaluation of Ely’s theory.  In any event, it suffices 
for present purposes to observe that it remains a dominant theme in 
the legal literature.235  For one does not have to be a partisan or 
devotee of the theory to acknowledge that it reflects some degree 
of both descriptive and normative truth. 
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Whatever weight ought to be accorded considerations of 
process failure, there are no reasons to think that they afford a 
basis to invalidate the ACA.  As recounted above, the law is the 
product of one of the most salient, extended, and passionate 
political debates in modern memory.236  While this conversation 
was at times uncivil,237 no one can credibly claim that the March 
23, 2010 enactment caught him unawares.  And the political 
conversation continues and will undoubtedly be a major issue in 
the 2012 election as it was last fall. 
Far more importantly, however, is the fact that the 
individual mandate, the only provision in the law found by any 
judge to be of doubtful constitutional validity, is exactly the kind 
of legal imposition which the political process is most likely to 
impose justly.  As Justice Jackson observed more than sixty years 
ago, 
 
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we 
should not forget today, that there is no more 
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government than to require that the 
principles of law which officials would impose 
upon a minority must be imposed generally. 
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary 
action so effectively as to allow those officials to 
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply 
legislation and thus to escape the political 
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger 
numbers were affected.  Courts can take no better 
measure to assure that laws will be just than to 
require that laws be equal in operation.238 
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The constitutional challenges to the individual mandate have 
emphasized the unprecedented breadth of this requirement.239  To 
be sure, aside from a few narrow exceptions,240 the mandate does 
indeed apply virtually to every American.241  And it is precisely the 
mandate’s all-encompassing nature that makes the case for judicial 
intervention so weak.  The universality of the requirement is itself 
the most “effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and 
unreasonable government”242 for which one could wish.  If the 
mandate, which has of course not yet gone into effect, proves in 
practice to be an intolerable yoke upon the citizenry, Congress and 
the President will be unable “to escape the [resulting] political 
retribution,”243 and their successors will repeal the law.  Far from 
necessitating judicial intervention,244 the circumstances of the 
ACA’s individual  mandate provision bolster the case for leaving 




 For better or worse, the federal judiciary has already been 
drawn deeply and irreversibly into the healthcare-reform-debate 
maelstrom.   Additional federal judicial rulings on the merits of the 
constitutional arguments arrayed against the statute are inevitable, 
and a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court finally resolving the 
matter seems likely as well. 
The ACA cases give those conservative federal judges and 
Justices who will decide them an almost perfect opportunity to do 
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something that is sorely needed and long overdue, and that is to 
begin restoration of a distinction between constitutional law and 
partisan politics.  Few would doubt that these judges must be 
sorely tempted to seize the tools afforded by the notoriously 
indeterminate law of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and employ them to dismantle a federal program 
detested by the American right like little else.  What is more, the 
cases are on a timeline such that they also offer the chance to rob 
the incumbent Democratic President of the signal achievement of 
his first term in the midst of his re-election campaign.  Millions 
already believe that these kinds of considerations will prove 
decisive in the minds of judges, whether or not they operate 
consciously.  Further judicial rulings along partisan lines of 
division will deepen such suspicions in countless future cases. 
For the same reasons, were these judges to resist this 
temptation and forego the partisan bounty it promises, they would 
demonstrate by their actions what a less partisan constitutional law 
would look like.  To be sure, were this to occur it would be but a 
small step toward a transformation of our legal and political 
culture.  But it may be a generation before another opportunity as 
significant as this one presents itself.  Moreover, the cases are well 
timed in another way, and that is that the Roberts Court has yet to 
address the precedential significance of Lopez and Morrison.  
There will never be a better time for the Roberts Court to signal 
that it will not countenance gamesmanship with constitutional 
principle.  There may never be a better opportunity for the Roberts 
Court, should it reach the matter, to exercise constitutional 
forbearance. 
 To be clear, only the naive can at this point in our history 
expect that it will do so.  The Court has recently had countless 
opportunities, albeit few quite as good the present one, to exercise 
forbearance and it has repeatedly declined to do so.  There is little 
reason to believe that the Justices will suddenly and dramatically 
re-orient their values in this instance.  But why not?  Now might be 
a good time to start thinking about who is to blame. 
